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A convertible obligation may be defined for the purpose of this
study as a corporate obligation to pay money which includes a
stipulation granting to the holder at his election the privilege 1
of requiring the debtor corporation to deliver shares of stock in
place of payment of the debt. A stock purchase warrant may be
defined as a corporate instrument by whose provisions the cor-
poration binds itself to deliver shares of its stock to the holder
at his election upon payment to it by the holder of a specified
sum of money per share, at or within a time, and on conditions
set forth in the instrument. The possessors of convertible obli-
gations and stock purchase warrants may be referred to, vhere
appropriate, as "privilege holders."
Convertible bonds and notes have been familiar documents on
the stock exchanges for a number of years. Stock purchase
warrants have only recently become fashionable, and their form
is not yet fixed. Commonly they are delivered by the corpora-
tion at the time of the sale of its bonds or notes, as part con-
sideration for the payment of the purchase price of such obliga-
tions. They are frequently, perhaps usually, separable from the
bonds; 2 they are sometimes physically attached in a manner
I The word "privilege" used in connection with conversion and stock pur-
chase warrants, besides being juridically accurate, is the classic phrase on
the subject. See the opinion of Field, J., in Hotchkiss v. Nat' Banks, 21
Wall. 354, at 355 (U. S. 1874): "The special agreement as to the scrip
preferred stock in no degree changes the duty of the company with re-
spect either to the principal or interest stipulated. It confers a privilege
upon the holder of the bond, upon its surrender and the surrender of the
certificate attached, of obtaining full preferred stock."
2 Occasionally in the past the stock purchase warrant, though nominally
separable, was joined to the bond itself. Thus, in perhaps the earliest
case of a true stock purchase warrant, Van Allen v. Illinois Central R. R.,
7 Bosw. 515 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1861) bonds had attached to them scrip
entitling the holder, on presentation of the bond, to become a stockholder
in the Illinois Central Railroad, but as such stockholder he was liable for
calls for the subscription price of the stock. It is true that it was repre-
sented calls would probably never be made on the stockholders. Appar-
ently, however, the scrip had to be presented with the bond itself, though
physically separable.
Occasionally the instrument giving the right to convert a bond is sep-
arable, but the ability to separate the privilege is illusory, since the bond
has to be presented for conversion along with the scrip embodying the
agreement giving the privilege of conversion. This was the case in Hotch-
kiss v. Nat1 Banks, supra note 1. Today, the conversion privilege is usually
embodied in the bond itself. A stock purchase warrant is usually a sep-
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permitting separation, or they may be wholly distinct instru-
ments delivered simultaneously with the bonds or notes, or they
may be entirely independent instruments not connected with
obligations for the payment of money. They are frequently
delivered to banking houses of issue and retained by such houses
as a part of their compensation for undertaking flotation of an
issue of security. They are commonly bought and sold in the
open market. Their only invariable features are covenants on
the part of the issuing corporation to deliver stock upon payment
of a stated price (which may vary depending on the time when
the holder exercises his privilege, or on the number of shares
which have been issued to holders for their warrants at the time
of exercise) and covenants defining and limiting the time or
times, or period of time, as the case may be, at or within which
the privilege may be exercised. It is perhaps apposite to ex-
amine their exact status, not without a certain wonder at the
sudden popularity of a form of financing whose incidents are so,
little known.
OF THE NATURE OF CONVERTIBLE OBLIGATIONS AND STOCK
PURCHASE WARRANTS
The privilege granted to the holder of a convertible obligation
to require stock at his election instead of money in payment of
the debt evidenced by the instrument, is an option.3 Both as
a matter of law and of common sense, this conception seems
well-founded. The privilege and the covenants creating it are no
part of the corporate obligation to pay money; they are sepa-
rable from the promise to pay; their invalidity will not affect it. 4
The stock purchase warrant is likewise an option, and follows
in large measure the rules relating to convertible obligations.
arate instrument, physically detachable from the obligation to pay money
and exercisable without presentation of the obligation.
3 See Pratt v. American Bell Telephone Co., 141 Mass. 225, 5 N. E. 307
(1886); John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Worcester R. R., 149 Mass.
214, 21 N. E. 364 (1889); Day v. Worcester R. R., 151 Mass. 302, 23 N. E.
824 (1890) ; Chaffee v. Middlesex R. R., 146 Mass. 224, 17 N. E. 316 (1888) ;
Gay v. Burgess Mills, 30 R. I. 231, 74 Atl. 714 (1909); Wall v. Utah
Copper Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 17, 62 Atl. 533 (1905); Belmont v. Erie R. R., 52
Barb. 637 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1869).
4 Parkinson v. West End Ry., 173 Mass. 446, 53 N. E. 891 (1899);
Hotchkiss v. Nat'l Banks, supra note 1. Further, where the obligation to,
pay money is extended, nothing being said about the conversion privilege,
the extension does not apply to the conversion privilege. See Muhlenberg
v. Philadelphia & Reading R. R., 47 Pa. St. 16 (1864). There a convertible
bond matured on July 1, 1860. Conversion was allowed up to date of ma-
turity. An agreement was entered into extending the maturity of the loan.
Held, that this did not extend the conversion date measured by the original
maturity.
5 Van Allen v. Illinois Central R. R., supra note 2.
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But it has peculiar problems of its own. The question of con-
sideration does not ordinarily arise in the case of a convertible
obligation; the covenant of conversion and the covenant to pay
money are both supported by the payment of cash to or for
account of the debtor corporation. The stock purchase warrant,
however, may be issued by the corporation for no apparent con-
sideration whatever. Although such instruments are commonly
transferred in connection with the issue of obligations, the con-
sideration of the obligation is plainly the payment of money for
it,6 and the separability of the warrant may militate against
the idea that the purchase price of the obligation includes also
a payment for the privilege contained in the warrant. Neither
a convertible obligation nor a stock purchase warrant, as such,
gives the holder an equitable right in shares of stock. Such
instruments create no trust in respect of any reserved shares;
nor do they place the holder in a position to enforce any of the
rights of a shareholder. All of the incidents of the situation
must be worked out on simple lines of contract.
One question peculiar to stock purchase warrants deserves a
word. At present these documents are commonly made in favor
of "bearer" and pass from hand to hand. They are regarded
as negotiable. They are not covered by the provisions of the
uniform stock transfer act; and they have no body of custom
hardening into law such as protects stock certificates. Their
negotiability remains to be established.8 Unlike the privilege of
6 In at least one case the question of consideration was seriously raised,
though the court found it possible to decide without passing on the point.
Welles v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 163 Fed. 330 (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 190S) in
which the plaintiff was the legatee of the original purchaser of the con-
vertible bond. After holding that the conversion privilege was distinct
-from the obligation to pay money, the court found it unnecessary to pass
on the question whether or not this obligation in the hands of the plaintiff
'had been acquired for consideration, passing to the railroad, since the con-
version right was denied on other grounds.
7 Parkinson v. West End Ry., supra note 4; Pratt v. American Bell Tele-
phone Co., supra note 3.
s The early cases rather plainly intimate that instruments containing
the conversion privilege and stock purchase warrants are not negotiable
and cannot become so. Thus, in Hotchkiss -. Nat'l Banks, -upra note 1, it
was remarked that the obligation to pay was negotiable, but that this did
-not necessarily extend to the attached scrip agreement permitting conver-
sion; in Van Allen v. Illinois Central R. R., supra note 2, the holder of the
right to subscribe was treated as an assignee; in Welch v. Sage, 47 N. Y.
143 (1872) upon the same state of facts as in Hotchkiss v. Nat'l Banks
(where a bond having a detachable scrip promise to convert the bond into
stock was stolen, the scrip promise removed and the bond pledged with a
-bank) it was held that the rules governing negotiability of the bond would
apply to protect the pledgee of the stolen bond, despite the fact that the
scrip itself was not negotiable. See also Lisman v. Milwaukee, L. S. & W.
It. R., 161 Fed. 472 (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1908), aff'd 170 Fed. 1020 (C. C. A.
17th, 1909), certiorari denied, 214 U. S. 520, 29 Sup. Ct. 700 (1909).
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conversion contained in an obligation to pay money which passes
with the obligation itself as an incident thereof, the stock pur-
chase warrant must stand upon its own terms. It is believed,
however, that negotiability to the extent permitted to stock cer-
tificates will be worked out on the simple ground that an instru-
ment of naked promise running to bearer contemplates assign-
ment, and both by actual intent and verbal implication imports
(1) consent on the part of the issuing company that such
assignment may be made and (2) an agreement to honor the
assignment when made. Since the form of assignment is the
same as that appearing upon a stock certificate, and upon the
familiar documents granting a stockholder the right to subscribe
-perhaps the closest approximation to the stock purchase war-
rant known prior to the appearance of the latter instrument-an
intention may be presumed (and the presumption will be based
on an overwhelming probability in fact) that the same effect was
contemplated. Further, the privilege, whether of conversion or
of purchase, is almost invariably expressed in terms of an offer
of a unilateral contract. A person fulfilling certain conditions
leaps into the position of obligee under the contract., The con-
ditions are that he possess a particular instrument; that he,
present it at a stated time and place; that he tender either an
obligation for cancellation, or a stated sum of money. These are
the essential terms of the offer; and it is not material to the
discussion to determine how the person fulfilling the conditions
became able to do so.10 For purposes of market transaction, the
result would be a practical negotiability.
Three points of view are important in considering the type of
security under discussion: (1) that of the holder of the privilege;
(2) that of the stockholders in the issuing corporation; and (3)
Despite this adverse authority, courts can hardly be blind to the fact
that a new commercial instrument is appearing, concerning which a custom
of merchants has already grown up.
9 This unilateral quality appears in a number of instances and is per-
haps the best recognized incident of a conversion privilege, and the same
result will probably follow in connection with stock purchase warrants.
See, for example, Carpenter v. Chicago, Al. & S. P. Ry., 119 App. Div. 169,
171, 104 N. Y. Supp. 152, 153 (1st Dept. 1907) where McLaughlin, J., said:
"What the defendant agreed to do was to pay the bonds on the first of
July, 1905, or to accept them before that date in payment of preferred
stock, providing certain conditions specified were complied with." To the
same effect is Loomis v. Chicago, M. & S. P. Ry., 102 Fed. 233 (C. C. A. 2d,
1900); Van Allen v. Illinois Central R. R., supra note 2, in which the
right to subscribe was considered as an option, providing certain specific
conditions were complied with.
10 The text discussion assumes the usual form of a convertible bond or
stock purchase warrant, in which upon fulfilling certain conditions the
privilege holder becomes immediately entitled to receive stock. It is, of
course, possible to conceive of an option to enter into a bilateral contract,
as, for instance, to purchase stock on the installment plan.
The nature of an option requires a word. The writer has here followed
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that of the corporation itself. The three diverging views form
the outline of the ensuing discussion.
OF HOLDERS OF CONVERTIBLE OBLIGATIONS AND STOCK PURCHASE
WARRANTS
The motive leading investors to acquire convertible obli-
gations and stock purchase warrants is the desire to secure an
opportunity to participate in the business of the issuing corpo-
ration for a fixed price. The bargain the investor usually thinhs
he is making is that he will acquire stock bearing the privileges
which stock of the same class has at the time he purchases the
corporate obligation, but which, over a period of time, will have
proved very valuable. This is a misconception. Corporations
are not static; they retrogress or move forward, their capital
structure changes, and the share of stock of today, while legally
an identical unit with the share of tomorrow, commercially may
have become entirely different.
For purposes of illustration we may take a convertible note
to pay $1,000 with a privilege in the holder to demand in lieu
thereof ten shares of stock of the par value of $100 each. The
same consideration will be applicable to the holder of a stock
purchase warrant entitling the holder to purchase 10 shares of
such stock at $100 each. Let it be assumed that the shares are
of common stock, and that the corporation has only one class of
shares outstanding. All of the earnings of the corporation inure
to ,the benefit of this class of stock. Assume further that the
corporation has a large surplus already accumulated forming a
part of the book value of this stock, when the warrants or con-
vertible obligations are issued; and that the privilege of conver-
sion or of purchase does not come into effect for a period of
two years. Within that time the corporation may have dis-
tributed its entire surplus as dividends; or may have created an
issue of preferred stock placing the common stock in a highly
unattractive position both as to assets and dividends; or it may
have reduced the par value of its shares; or it may have divided
them into many shares of a less par value; or may have made
them over into non-par shares; or may have issued additional
shares of the same class; or may have paid stock dividends; or
have merged, consolidated, or even dissolved. In short, the en-
the theory that an option consists of two distinct elements: (a) an offer to
contract, which, in the case of convertible obligations and stoch purchase
warrants, is commonly a unilateral offer, and (b) an agreement not to
revoke such offer. Obviously, the rights of the privilege holder prior to
the exercise of his privilege arise under the second characteristic of the
option. After its exercise he may be enforcing the obligation of the corpo-
ration under either or both characteristics.
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tire capital structure of the concern may have been radically
altered; with or without changing the nature or ending the
existence of the shares themselves. Any one of these steps may
be fatal to the hopes of the privilege holder. What rights, if
any, has he?
He has in any event a right to require the obligor corporation
to maintain the integrity of the shares,-that is to say, to main-
tain the shares as the same or equivalent units of contribution
-of capital-in respect of which the privilege is granted, in such
manner as will permit the corporation to fulfill its obligation.
The holder of a privilege to acquire shares enforceable upon
election is in no sense a stockholder.12 Any rights he has must
be derived from his contract. At law this right is single and
simple: at the time of election, if the corporation is not in a
position to deliver stock to him, he may recover as damages the
difference between the market value of the stock he is entitled to
require at the time of election, and the cost of the stock at the
conversion or option rate.12 This rule, worked out originally in
cases where the corporation was in a position to deliver stock
but refused to do so, has never been altered. Plainly this remedy
is inadequate to cover such elusive organisms as shares of stock.
The market value, the ability of the corporation to deliver, the
very existence and identity of the thing depends too much on
the will of the corporate management. Unless the privilege of
conversion or purchase is guarded in some more fundamental
way it can be rendered nugatory.
In an early case the courts faced a situation in which the ob-
ligor corporation had consolidated with another, changing its
name and powers, and the consolidated corporation's shares were
distributed to the stockholders of both of the consolidating cor-
porations upon a plane of absolute parity with the old stock.
Mr. Justice Holmes was able to spell out a continuation of the
corporate entity under the guise of the consolidated corporation,
and he enforced the privilege of conversion by requiring delivery
of stock in the new corporation.3 Where, again, a corporation
issued convertible bonds entitling the holder to exact 10 shares
of the corporation's capital stock with a par value of $100 per
share for each $1,000 of principal obligation, and the corpora-
tion changed its authorized stock from $100 par value to $1.00
par value, it was recognized on all sides and a decree entered,
that the privilege holder might demand stock having a par value
of $1,000 for each $1,000 of obligation-that is, that his conver-
11 Gay v. Burgess Mills, supra note 3; Chaffee v. Middlesex R. R., supra
mote 3.
12 See Lisman v. Milwaukee, L. S. & W. Ry., supra note 8; Chaffee V.
Middlesex R. R., supra note 3.
"3Chaffee v. Middlesex R. R., supra note 3.
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sion right permitted him to exact the equivalent par value of
stock, though the number of shares constituting it had been
altered.4 Looking through the bare form of the stock certificate
the court perceived an obligation to deliver a fixed unit of capital
and decreed performance upon that basis.
Mlany covenants in support of conversion or stock purchase
warrants explicitly state this rule at present. Particularly
where the privilege may be exercised in respect of stock without
nominal or par value-in which case the shares may be split with
great ease so that the units covered by the privilege have actually
been diminished in value, thereby impairing their integrity,
though nominally they appear the same-it is frequently pro-
vided that the conversion privilege may be exercised in respect
of a greater number of shares in the event of any splitting of
units. It is believed that these specific covenants merely state
the rule which a court of equity would enforce in any event. The
fact that the conversion privilege uses a name which is applicable
to the shares both before and after the splitting-up process, can
hardly be construed to give the obligor corporation liberty to
evade its promise by completely altering the unit value of the
share.
Where this unit of capital is measured by par value, the prob-
lem is simple enough. The privilege holder is entitled to receive
stock of or aggregating the par value of the stock stipulated to
be delivered to him on the exercise of his privilege. Where, hov-
ever, the stock is non-par, the problem becomes difficult to state,
though not logically distinguishable in kind.13 Each share of
non-par stock has a capital value, measured by the consideration
dedicated to capital, paid for the share. It is true that new
shares may be issued for a less consideration, thereby affecting
the capital value of all outstanding shares. If, however, addi-
tonal non-par shares represent additional contributions to
capital approximately equal to the capital value at the time of
issue of the then outstanding shares, the relative values of units
are preserved, though the actual amount of capital contribution
may have varied. The varying price at which new shares of
non-par stock can be issued should, if their consideration is equi-
tably fixed, merely reflect the fortunes of war of the corporation
and the corresponding fluctuations in value of its outstanding.
shares.
But where new non-par shares are issued for a consideration
14Gay v. Burgess Mills, supra note 3; John Hancock Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Worcester Ry., supra note 3.
15' See, for a good example of very specific covenants granting to holders
of convertible bonds the right to participate in split units of non-par stocz,
the trust indenture securing the issue of Cuba Cane Sugar Company Con-
vertible 7% Gold Bonds.
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which does not reflect an equitable contribution to the corporate
resources, so that the new shares derive an undue advantage over
the old, (as it were, levying tribute on them) what has occurred
is not an increase of the number of capital units, but a partial
splitting of the units. Mathematically this will occur whenever
non-par stock is issued at a price lower than the book value of
the non-par shares already outstanding.- The mathematical
test is too rigid practically, and the test should be whether or not
the new shares have been issued for a fair price based on the
existing market for such stock.
In case there has actually been not an addition of a number of
new units bearing approximately an equal burden, but the split-
ting of the old units into a number of fractions, the rule of the
Rhode Island court in respect of par stock should be applied to
non-par shares, and the privilege should be applied to a sufficient
number of the new units as will, in the aggregate, place the
privilege holder in the same position he would have held had the
old units been preserved. And this should be the rule whether
in equity or at law; for the damages at law will then be based
not on the strict number of shares described in the privilege, but
upon the market value of the number of shares of old units had
they been maintained intact.
Surplus is quite another matter. The privilege of conversion
or purchase, as has been seen, binds the corporation's hands as
regards distribution of its capital; but there is no equivalent
rule as to surplus. Suppose at the time of issuing a stock pur-
chase warrant or a convertible note, the stock has a given right
in capital, and a pro rata share of surplus attributable to it. It
is well settled, and rightly so, that the corporation may, if it
chooses, strip its surplus account bare, distributing it fully to
the stockholders without considering the effect on the value of
the shares in respect of which the privilege might operate.17 If
16 For a discussion of the price at which non-par stock may be issued,
and the theory that where issued for an unduly low price, such stock levies
tribute on all other stock of the same class, thereby effecting the splitting
of capital, see Berle, Problems of Non-Par Stock (1925) 25 CoL. L. REV.
43, 56. The problem has recently been under very close and careful re-
view in the case of Hodgman v. Atlantic Refining Co., 300 Fed. 590 (D.
Del. 1924) rev'd, 13 Fed. (2d) '781 (C. C. A. 3d, 1926). The rule adopted
Dy both the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals in this liti-
gation was the same; but the Circuit Court of Appeals found peculiar facts
to exist, justifying impairment of the capital units, as this seemed to be
necessary to provide funds for the corporation.
17 Pratt v. American Bell Telephone Co., supra note 3 (issue of now
stock impairing accumulated surplus); Sutliff v. Cleveland & Mahoning
R. R., 24 Ohio, 147 (1873) (distribution of surplus by way of stock divi-
dend).
The extreme application of this rule occurred in the case of Gay v.
Burgess Mills, supra note 3. There the directors declared a dividend of
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the privilege holder wishes to participate in the distribution he
must elect to become a stockholder and convert his obligation, or
pay for his stock. 'Up to the last moment of election, he is not
accorded any of the rights of a stockholder. This is good sense
as well as good law. It rests upon the actual intent of the
parties, whether expressed or tacit. The surplus of a corpora-
tion is not only subject to distribution, but the distribution of it,
or at least a portion of it, is the very objective which leads in-
vestors to become stockholders. Receipt of dividends is perhaps
the prime desire of every stockholder. The privilege holder
knows this. He certainly is in no position to quarrel if the cor-
poration makes distribution, whether by way of cash dividend or
stock dividend; there is no obligation resting on the corporation
to maintain any surplus fund for the benefit of the privilege
holders.18
50%, payable 10% annually during 5 years, but payable only to stock-
holders of record on the date of declaration. This stripped the corpora-
tion absolutely bare of surplus account. Thereafter, the holder of a con-
vertible bond exercised his conversion privilege and demanded to be al-
lowed to share in the dividend declared, though his stock was acquired
subsequent to the record date. The Rhode Island court held that he was
not entitled to participate.
It may be asked, what, then, is the value of the privilege of conversion
or purchase? Obviously, the principal hope of increase in value of a share
of stock is the piling up of surplus behind it, a surplus in which the shares
of stock optioned to the privilege holder would participate. As has been
seen, there is no reason why this surplus should be maintained for the
benefit of the privilege holder.
Valuation of the privilege is perhaps rather for the banker than the law-
yer to estimate. Yet the answer seems plain. Over a period of time the
enterprise in question may have demonstrated an earning capacity. Al-
though no surplus is piled up, the value of a share with a demonstrated
earning capacity, is far greater than the value of a share without. Mani-
festly, for the interests of the stockholders, strategy would seem to dictate
that the corporation declare out all its surplus as dividends prior to the
arrival of the conversion or option date; or, if it needs working capital,
capitalize such surplus and declare a stock dividend. This would prevent
privilege holders from sharing in surplus. Yet the fact that the enter-
prise could earn a respectable surplus would give value to the optioned
shares, making exercise of the privilege worth-while. Stock purchase war-
rants are too new to have reached the stage when corporations endeavor
to wrestle with the possibility of avoiding a distribution of the profits of
past years to privilege holders who elect to demand stock.
Is As soon, however, as such privilege holder has exercised his privilege,
the situation changes at once. He becomes a stockholder, and any dis-
crimination against him will be prevented by the courts. Thus, in Jones
v. Terre Haute & Richmond R. R., 57 N. Y. 196 (1874) a conversion privi-
lege was exercised by mail on November 26 and stock actually issued on
December 3. On December 17 the directors declared a cash dividend and a
stock dividend to stockholders of record on November 30, payable January
1. The plaintiff brought an action for both dividends. The corporation
defended on the ground that he was not a stockholder of record on Novem-
ber 30. The New York Court of Appeals held that he was entitled to both
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Similar considerations govern the financial structure of the
enterprise in other matters. If the privilege is granted in respect
of common stock at a time when the corporation has no other
stock outstanding, and it later chooses to load its capital struc-
ture with a burdensome issue of preferred stock having priority
both as to assets and as to dividends, the position of the common
stock in respect of which the privilege was granted, may become
far less valuable than was the case when the privilege holder
purchased his warrant or his convertible obligation. It seems,
however, that he has no right to complain. True, no additional
issue of stock may be created which will absorb to itself any
part of the capital contribution in respect of the original shares.
Should it do so we should have the phenomenon of splitting of
units, and the rule applicable to preservation of capital integrity
would at once come into play. Where this is not the case, the
privilege holder finds himself in exactly the same position as
the other holders of the class of stock in respect of which his
privilege was granted; and the value of his privilege shares the
fortunes of war with the value of other stock.
OF THE POSITION OF THE STOCKHOLDERS IN CORPORATIONS
CREATING PRIVILEGES OF CONVERSION
OR PURCHASE
The position of the holder of outstanding shares of a corpora-
tion which has or is about to create privileges of conversion or
purchase is precisely the same in respect of the instruments car-
rying such privilege as it is in connection with the issue of shares
of stock in respect of which the privilege is granted.
These rights are, on the whole, plainly defined. Where par
stock is concerned, new shares having par value must be issued
for not less than par.19 Where his own and new shares are
without par value, his right is that his pro rata share in the
corporate assets shall not be diminished unreasonably by the
new issue. The law on this subject is crystallizing into a rule
that new non-par shares must be issued within reasonable range
of the best obtainable price.20
He has also a pro rata share of control based upon the propor-
tion of votes which his shares can exercise in ratio to the total
amount of authorized shares. This right together with his
right in accumulated surplus, if any, is protected by granting to
dividends, since the directors were not entitled by antedating the record
date, to prevent the privilege holder from sharing in the general distribu-
tion.
'19 Carver v. Southern Iron & Steel Co., 78 N. J. Eq. 81, '78 Atl, 24D
(1910) (a careful examination of the subject by Garrison, V. C.).
20 See supra note 16.
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him a privilege of preempting, in proportion to the number of
shares held by him, any newly created issue of stock to be sold
for cash.2 1
All of the foregoing stockholders' rights exist where privi-
lege of conversion or purchase is granted by the corporation. It
is thus settled that securities convertible into stock having par
value may not be issued at a price materially less than par, and
that conversion must take place at a rate which will be equiva-
lent to payment of the par value of the stock to be received. As
to non-par shares, the question appears never to have been
passed upon; but it is hardly conceivable that the courts would
not afford a stockholder a remedy by way of injunction were the
conversion or option price fixed at a rate which would impair
the capital value of the outstanding shares. There is, however,
a peculiar problem incident to the fluctuating price at which non-
par stock can be issued. Since the value of a non-par share is
the aliquot portion of the corporate assets attributable to such
share, and since this value at a given time cannot be prophe-
sied in advance, the rate at which conversion or purchase may
take place fixed in the convertible obligation or warrant, while
just at the time of the issue of such instruments, may be grossly
unfair when the time for the exercise of the privilege arrives.22
It is believed, however, that the stockholder is sufficiently pro-
tected if the conversion rate or purchase price is fixed at a rate
asce tainably fair at the time the privilege is created. The in-
creased value of the stock, so far as the mathematics of the
21 The double reason for the right of preemption-pre-servation of pro-
portionate voting control and preservation of proportionate property in-
terest-is well stated in Crosby v. Stratton, 17 Colo. App. 212, 220, 6S Pac.
130 (1902). The cases are collected in 14 C. J. 394, note 37. See particu-
larly Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 285, 78 N. E. 1090 (190G).
22 There is a difference between the rules governing issue of non-par
shares and par shares.
Holders of par shares agree, or at least understand and contemplate,
that new issues of stock may take place at par, though mathematically
this might reduce the value of the outstanding par shares because of dilu-
tion of surplus. In such case the stockholder is protected in some measure
by his preemptive right. There is authority (Stokes v. Continental Trust
Co., supra note 21) to the effect that par shares may be issued at a higher
price; and it is true that some public utilities commissions require public
service companies to issue their stock at more than par, but this is based
not on corporation law but on the requirement that a public service corpo-
ration secure additional capital as economically as possible.
Non-par shares, however, apparently must be issued for a price which
will be fair to existing stockholders, whatever may have been their original
capital contributions. Accordingly, in a convertible issue it is always per-
missible to name par or better as a conversion price in respect of par
shares, since new par shares can always be issued at par. It is never pos-
sible, however, to forecast accurately the price at which non-par shares
could be issued at a future time.
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situation is concerned, must depend on the piling up of a sur-
plus account. As has been seen, the corporation is in a posi-
tion to distribute this, thereby protecting the stockholder. Since
the stockholders themselves must (as will be seen) authorize the
creation of the privilege, they will have assented to the possi-
* bility envisaged. Still more important, they are protected by
preemption rights.
Preemption in respect of newly created shares of stock rests
on judicial rather than statutory law. Directed originally to-
ward preserving to stockholders their aliquot control, it has
become an instrument of even more importance for the pur-
pose of maintaining stockholders' rights in surplus. Grants of a
privilege of conversion or purchase present exactly the same
threat both as to control and rights in accumulated surplus
(though in the latter case the threat is weaker) as do newly
created shares of stock.23 It has accordingly been settled, and
careful corporation lawyers recognize, that convertible obliga-
tions and stock purchase warrants must be first offered pre-
emptively to the existing shareholders of the corporation, to the
same degree that the shares of stock in respect of which the
privilege is granted must be offered. Shareholders can enjoin
the issue of such privilege unless and until they are granted
such preemption right. Probably in respect of convertible obli-
gations, the corporation has not even the historic method of
eluding its obligation by the issue of obligations for property. It
23 For a very careful examination of the rights of a stockholder when an
issue of bonds convertible into stock of the same class is created, see Wall
v. Utah Copper Co., supra note 3, per Pitney, V. C.
The rights of the stockholder with respect to an issue of convertible
bonds or stock purchase warrants are strictly limited to the rights he would
have with respect to the option as to stock. It is entirely conceivable that he
may have no preemption rights whatever-as, where the optioned stock
has already been offered to the stockholders and declined or where the
stock is authorized and unissued but not newly created.
A different and very intricate situation may arise after the issue of
the convertible obligation or warrant. At the time when this obligation is
offered; shares may be reserved to take care of conversion or purchase
warrants, which are not subject to preemption. These may be disposed of
and an attempt made to create a new issue, to be held for the privilege
holders. The obligations being already offered, it is impossible to offer
them pro 'rata to shareholders. The impasse is complete. The newly
created issue may be preempted by shareholders if they so desire; and the
corporation will have no stock to deliver to the privilege holders, laying
itself open to an action in damages.
As a practical matter, the corporation can authorize so large an issue
of new shares that its existing shareholders will not take them up, and
thereby place itself in a position to redeem its obligations, but this is
manipulation and not law.
Statutes not infrequently affect preemptive rights. In New York it is
an open question whether there is a preemptive right in connection with
convertible bonds. See Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923) c. 60, § 16.
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can issue shares for property without granting a preemptive
right-though the logic of this has never been satisfactorily de-
veloped. It can issue promises to pay in return for property;
but a conversion privilege attached to such an obligation will
not mean that the stock issued on the exercise of the conversion
right is issued for property. The stock is issued for cash, the cash
being applied to the liquidation of the obligation to pay. It
would seem, therefore, that the preemptive right applies in prac-
tically every case where convertible obligations are issued, pro-
vided that the stock in respect of which such privilege can be
exercised, would itself be subject to such preemption.
OF THE POSITION OF THE CORPORATION
The position of the corporation is largely delimited by the
foregoing discussion. Its liability, however, is distinct. It is a
mechanism through which all of the rights, both of privilege
holders and shareholders, must be worked out; and a violation of
any of their rights will react almost exclusively upon the corpo-
ration itself. It is, in a sense, the stakeholder. Some of its
specific liabilities may be listed:
(1) It must be in a position to deliver the stock in respect
of which a privilege of conversion or purchase is granted, at the
time when such privilege is exercised. While apparently it
need not keep such stock on hand continuously, nevertheless
when the day comes it must deliver, or become liable in dam-
ages.
(2) It must so manage its corporate affairs that the integrity
or equivalence of capital contribution of the unit, to be delivered
upon exercise of the privilege, has not been impaired. Should
it fail to do so, there is a liability in damages and properly, for
the situation permits of an equitable liability to deliver exist-
ing units which will place the privilege holder in the position he
would have been in had the agreed units been delivered.
(3) It must, on creation of a privilege of conversion or pur-
chase, offer to its existing shareholders a preemptive right to
the extent that such shareholders will have such right in respect
of the stock to be delivered on the exercise of the privilege. Fail-
ure to observe this obligation will afford ground for injunctive re-
lief; or if the process has gone too far to permit aid by injunc-
tion, the shareholders can sue the management for ensuing dam-
ages.
(4) It mustLfix the price at which the privilege can be exer-
cised at not less than par in respect of par shares, or at not less
than a fair price at the time of creation in respect of non-par
shares, regard being had to the equitable rules governing the
price at which new non-par shares may be offered. Here again
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the stockholders may be permitted injunctive relief, or they may
hold the management liable for such damages as can be estab-
lished where the obligation is disregarded.
(5) It is subject to such specific restrictions in respect of
privileges of conversion or purchase created by it, as are con-
tained in its agreement with such privilege holders.
Must the corporation stay in existence? Mr. Justice Holmes
has answered this in the negative,24 remarking that "if the cor-
poration which made the bond finds it for its interest to go out
of existence at or before the maturity of the obligation, the op-
tion given to the bondholder will not stand in the way." So far
as mere dissolution of the corporation is concerned, this is ap-
parently the rule today.25 It is believed, however, that the brutal
statement of Holmes, J., is far too broad to cover the present
circumstances. Were the process merely a formal one-disso-
lution in one state and reincorporation in another-though the
legal identity be changed, the commercial identity is so far the
same that it would seem mere fraud to deprive the privilege
holder of his right. Even Mr. Justice Holmes' statement would
not cut off the holder's right to damages-a liability which
would survive even the dissolution of the corporation, since the
corporate entity is invariably preserved for the purpose of ful-
filling its contract obligations. Probably the corporation may
terminate its activities and its existence, and there being no
enterprise in which to share, the subject matter of the option
has passed out of existence and the contract itself falls thereby,
just as an option given by X to sell to Y his yacht ceases to be
effective if the yacht sinks. But where the enterprise has merely
changed its legal clothes, an entirely different picture is pre-
sented. The liability of the dying corporation can be charged in
24 Parkinson v. West End Ry., supra note 4, at 448, 53 N. E. at 892.
25 In Lisman v. Milwaukee, L. S. & W. Ry., supra note 8, the holder of
bonds convertible into stock of the defendant, demanded conversion long
after the defendant had consolidated with the Chicago, Milwaukee & St.
Paul Railroad. Conversion was allowed within ten days after a dividend
date; since consolidation had taken place, no dividends had been declared,
the stock being dead. Held, that the privilege holder was bound to antici-
pate the vicissitudes of the corporation, including change of ownership; and
his conversion privilege was thus wiped out. To same effect, see Taggart
and Bennett v. Northern Central Ry., 29 Md. 557 (1868) (where, how-
-ever, there was an element of estoppel, because the privilege holder who
had also been a stockholder voted to approve the consolidation); Welles v.
Chicago & N. W. Ry., supra note 6; Rosenkrans v. Lafayette, B. & M. R. R.,
18 Fed. 513 (C. C. D. Ind. 1883).
How far these cases of legislative consolidation could be held to apply
to the less drastic industrial reorganizations of today may be fairly dis-
puted. Certainly, if the only object of reorganization were to cut off the
conversion privilege, it would seem that equity would afford a remedy. The
"traceable identity" rule stated in the text above seems a possible line of
approach to an equitable solution.
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equity against the assets of the nascent one; every element of
fraud is present.
Reorganization may, however, be far more complex. By en-
tering a combination, as, a consolidation of many units, the
enterprise may have so changed its character that its identity
will have been lost, though the substance of it continues com-
pounded with different elements. Relief in such cases must
turn upon the circumstances involved; only a general line of
attack can be suggested. Where the process approximates ex-
tnction of the enterprise, the privilege should fall. Where, how-
ever, its form has merely been changed so that the share units
of the old enterprise are traceable with relative clarity into
share units of the new enterprise, it is submitted that equity
should afford relief. This might be by requiring delivery of the
new share units; or if that is impossible, by requiring the con-
solidated corporation to shoulder a liability in damages based
upon the difference between the price which the privilege holder
would have paid for the old shares and the value so far as as-
certainable of the equivalent units into which those shares have
been transmuted. This implies a modification of Mr. Justice
Holmes' decision. The reason is not far to seek. Corporate
procedure has become far more fluid since the days when cor-
porations (as was the case with those he had under considera-
tion) were chartered by special legislative act. Today the cor-
porate form of organization lies almost wholly in the choice of
the men in charge of the enterprise. The commercial, not the
legal, entity controls the situation. Obligations to deliver stock,
despite their peculiar incidents, are no less sacred than obliga-
tions to pay money. Particularly where stock purchase war-
rants are concerned, the value of such promises passes currently.
The equity of a convertible bondholder of 1899 was not so strong
as to lead courts to be astute to safeguard the conversion privi-
lege. The equity of a holder of an open market warrant of to-
day should command the power of a court of equity even to
follow an enterprise into a reorganization changing its legal en-
tity, for the purpose of ascertaining, wherever possible, whether
the corporate promise can be enforced; and if it cannot be ful-
filled in kind, of awarding monetary recovery which will make
good the loss of the privilege holder.
The other question which will persistently face the corpo-
ration is connected with proper authorization and corporate ac-
tion in connection with the creation of the privilege. It may
validly bind itself by issuing an appropriate convertible obliga-
tion or warrant to deliver shares, even though the shares are
unauthorized and uncreated. This situation has come under
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judicial scrutiny on various occasions. 6 That the contract binds
the corporation has never been questioned. The improvidence of
such a situation from the corporation's point of view is obvious.
It may, of course, place itself in a position to fulfill its terms
by subsequent corporate action, and if its stockholders are com-
plaisant, no harm is done. Until some privilege holder demands
his stock at the appointed time, however dangerous the corpo-
rate situation may be, the privilege holder is not in a position
to object. Should the corporate stockholders refuse to authorize
the additional issue of stock, specific performance will not be
granted.2 7 The grounds have been variously stated; one of them
being that there is an adequate remedy at law through money
damages. Probably the more substantial reason is that a court
of equity is not in a position to compel the necessary stock-
holders' vote authorizing creation of new stock.28  In one case
it was held that the mere authorization of the convertible obli-
gation imported a creation of the additional stock; but that
decision turned on the peculiar situation involved.20 Until the
day of reckoning comes, the corporation may regard itself free;
at that time it must deliver shares if it have them; otherwise,
respond in damages.30
Its freedom in respect to surplus and to changes in its capital
structure, such as creation of stock having a priority over the
shares in respect of which the privilege is granted, has already
been noted. It is submitted the same freedom exists where it
28 Wood v. Whelen, 93 Ill. 153 (1879); Welles v. Chicago & N. W. Ry.,
supra note 6. In Belmont v. Erie R. R., supra note 3, at 671-673, the
endeavor was to enjoin an issue of convertible bonds on the ground that
the corporation had not authorized the stock into which such bonds could
be converted. Cardozo, J., discovered in the corporate charter and legis-
lation an authorization to the directors to issue convertible bonds. From
this he deduced that the directors without more had authority to create
the stock if, as and when necessary, for conversion purposes. To the same
effect is Ramsey v. Erie R. R., 38 How. Pr. 193 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1869). It
must, however, be remembered that the litigation affecting the Erie Rail-
road in the late 60's was not an academic affair. In one of these cases,
the court threatened to dismiss the whole proceeding on the ground that
the press and other outside agencies had so interfered with the conduct
of the case on the part of the persons attacking the Erie management as to
justify an equitable discretion in denying relief.
In New Jersey there is an odd statutory provision permitting the board
of directors to authorize shares in respect of which convertible obliga-
tions have been issued. See N. J. Laws 1902, c. 5, § 3.
27 Parkinson v. West End Ry., supra note 4.
28 Lisman v. Milwaukee, L. S. & W. Ry., supra note 8; Rosenkrans v.
Lafayette, B. & M. R. R., supra note 25 (a very unsatisfactory decision,
holding that inasmuch as the shares were no longer in existence, the right
of the bondholder- was unclear, and no relief would be granted. A con-
solidation had intervened, complicating the question).
29 Belmont v. Erie R. R., supra note 3.
30 Van Allen v. Illinois Central R. R., supra note 2.
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chooses to create participating preferred stock sharing in the
earnings otherwise attributable to the conversion shares. Just
as it may increase the number of its shares, preserving merely
the integrity of each as bearing an equal contribution to the
corporate capital, and thereby dividing the corporate income
among the increased number of units, so it may create other
units not altogether on a parity, yet sharing in the total in-
come. Probably it may, within limits, even alter the character-
istics of the shares themselves, but such changes must not be
so fundamental as to change their identit, or their essential
rights. The question is at once raised, what is an essential
right. The answer must rest on analogy, since the question has
not been squarely presented. Most charters are subject to
amendment and alteration; and under them stockholders' rights
can be altered. As regards preferred stock, it has been held that
certain alterations do not affect the essential rights of the hold-
ers; others, however, impair the fundamental contract upon
which the preferred shares were issued.2 Broadly speaking,
any change of right as to corporate procedure is not essential;
any alteration affecting the property value of the share, or its
voting right, so far affects its identity and worth that it cannot
be made without the consent of the holder. The privilege holder
is entitled to demand that the stock tendered him shall be essen-
tially identical with the stock as it stood at the time the privi-
lege was granted. It will be a question in each case whether or
not this identity has been impaired, yet following the rule in
Kent v. Quicksilver Milig Company 2 and the allied cases, it
should be no more difficult for courts to establish whether or not
there has been such impairment than in any other case where
the corporate charter is amended.
Authorization necessary to create a privilege rests in many
jurisdictions on statutory provisions. Not infrequently corpo-
ration acts require a particular consent of stockholders for
creation of a convertible issue. It cannot, however, be assumed
that such consent implies also a creation of the stock to be de-
livered in fulfillment of the privilege.1 There are two distinct
31 Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N. Y. 159 (1879).
32 Supra note 31.
33 It is true that in the Erie Railroad cases authorization to directors to
create convertible bonds was considered authorization to create stock. Most
statutes today guard the creation of stock far more carefully than was the
situation in those cases. Creation of additional authorized stock involves
an amendment to the corporate charter under modern practice, making
requisite at least nominal state action in filing a certificate. Action by
the board of directors, even if ratified by stockholders, would hardly operate
to amend the charter; and any attempt to secure state approval of such
action would fall, unless the appropriate agency of the state could be
shown direct statutory authority for amendment in this manner.
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processes: authorization of the privilege, and creation of the
stock. The latter must depend upon the rules governing the
creation of stock exactly as though it were disconnected with
any privilege.
It is sufficiently obvious that the practice of issuing convertible
obligations and stock purchase warrants is still in its infancy.
It is equally obvious that the somewhat casual way in which
these financial instruments were treated by the courts at the
end of the last century will certainly not be perpetuated. Pub-
lic interest in fulfillment of corporate obligations increases with
each new issue. Financial interest that the corporate promise
included in a public instrument shall be literally kept is funda-
mental. Only by strict performance will the faith of the invest-
ing public in such instruments be continued sufficiently to per-
mit further investment as time goes on. We have been con-
sidering privileges which relate not to a static or definitive sub-
ject matter, but to shares of stock which are subject to change
both in value and in kind, based on the corporate entity which
is itself subject to change, involution or even disappearance. It
is believed that the trend will be toward the evolution of equi-
table remedies tending to require the corporation to maintain it-
self in a position to meet the promises, whether of conversion or
of option to purchase, as they fall due; and to prevent it from
manipulating securities so as to deprive the privilege of its un-
derlying value, or to cheat the investor in them of the chance
for which he has bargained.
